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POLLUTION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE ON INDIAN




An essential means by which Indian tribes will maintain the integrity
of tribal lands is through environmental regulation.' Currently, it is
unclear who has the jurisdictional authority to administer environmen-
tal protection programs on tribal lands.2 Jurisdiction on Indian land
is apportioned among three governments - federal, tribal, and state
- all of which claim a degree of regulatory authority over the territory
of Indian nations.3
The federal government claims the right to regulate by virtue of its
asserted position as the dominant sovereign throughout the United
States.4 The tribal government claims entitlement to regulate the per-
sons and lands within its territorial domain pursuant to inherent
sovereign powers.' The state government claims regulatory authority
because Indian nations are not extraterritorial to the states and abut
them. 6
Tribal governments have traditionally been responsible for managing
natural resources located on Indian lands. 7 However, since most of
* Attorney, Crowe & Dunlevy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. J.D., 1991, University
of Oklahoma; B.B.A., 1987, University of Central Oklahoma; A.A., 1986, Rose State
College.
1. B. Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Tribal Environmental Regulation, 36 FED.
B. NEWs & J. 438 (1989).
2. Id.
3. Judith V. Royster & Rory Snow Arrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation
Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion,
64 WAsH. L. REv. 581, 584 (1989).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 585.
6. Id.
7. Washington: Final Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Management Pro-
gram, 51 Fed. Reg. 3783 (1986). The EPA views Indian lands as synonymous with
Indian Country. Indian Country encompasses all lands, including fee lands, within
reservation borders, all dependent Indian communities, and all Indian allotments.
The EPA's definition is an abbreviated version of the statutory definition of "Indian
Country," which includes:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
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the federal environmental statutes delegate authority to the states to
implement and enforce environmental protection programs,8 the tribal
governments have had an insignificant role in developing or imple-
menting federal environmental regulatory programs. 9 Congress, in
promulgating these statutes, failed to consider the regulatory authority
of the tribal governments and the limited nature of state authority on
Indian reservations.' 0 As a result of this failure, the question of whether
or not Indian tribes should be treated as states for purposes of federal
environmental statutes has arisen.
In 1983 the Reagan administration adopted a major new Indian
policy acknowledging the governmental status of Indian tribes." To
further this national Indian policy, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) issued a revised Indian environmental policy that addressed the
development and implementation of tribal environmental protection
programs under federal law.'
2
The majority of the seven federal environmental acts now contain
provisions authorizing tribes to be treated as states for most purposes.
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) 13
contains a provision that the tribes shall be treated as states under the
abandoned mine reclamation program. Amendments to the Clean Wa-
ter Act (CWA) 4, the Superfund Act (SARA), 5 and the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA) 6 have added "tribes-as-states" provisions. How-
ever, there are limitations to these provisions.
patent, and including rights of way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof,
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extin-
guished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
8. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6997
(1988) (RCRA); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)
(CAA); Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988) (CWA); Safe Drinking
Water Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1988) (SDWA); Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1978, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988) (FIFRA).
9. Richard A. DuBey et al., Protection of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous
Waste Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENvTL. L. 449, 450 (1988).
10. Gover & Walker, supra note 1, at 438.
11. DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 451.
12. Id.
13. 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1988).
14. 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (Supp. 1 1989).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (1988).
16. Id. § 300j-11(a).
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Other federal environmental statutes specifically delegate primary
authority for certain programs to the tribes. The Clean Air Act (CAA)1
7
gives exclusive authority to the tribes to redesignate air quality for
lands within the exterior boundaries of the reservations. 8 The Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)19 contains certain
provisions relating to funding, training, and certification which have
been extended to tribes. 20
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)21 is the only
federal environmental act which does not contain either a general
tribes-as-states section or express authorization for tribes to assume
certain program responsibilities. 22 While tribes are defined as being
among those "persons" to whom the enforcement provisions of the
RCRA apply, the statute is silent as to the authority of the states to
enforce their hazardous waste regulations against Indian tribes or
individuals on Indian land.23
This note discusses whether the federal government, the states, or
the tribes themselves have the authority to enforce environmental
regulations on Indian lands. It is this author's view that the authority
should be placed with the tribes. Even though some authority has been
granted to the tribes through the existing federal statutes, the authority
is not enough to provide for the effective implementation and enforce-
ment authority of the tribes. Thus, additional amendments to these
statutes are necessary and are also discussed.
L Jurisdiction
Congressional power over Indian lands is plenary under the Indian
Commerce Clause. 24 Congress may expressly assign jurisdiction over
Indian lands to federal, state, or tribal governments. 25 When Congress
is silent or ambiguous in its assignment of control, there is no guidance
17. Id. §§ 7401-7642.
18. Id. § 7474(c).
19. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
20. Id. § 136u.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6997 (1988).
22. Royster & Fausett, supra note 3, at 581.
23. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1985).
24. The Indian Commerce Clause confers authority on Congress to regulate com-
merce with Native American tribes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The source of
congressional authority over Native American lands is derived from this clause. Mc-
Clanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973); see also Rice
v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 718-19 (1983); Washington Dep't of Ecology, 752 F.2d at
1470; FELIX S. CoHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 259 n.120 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN]. See generally Leslie Allen, Who Should
Control Hazardous Waste on Native American Indian Lands? Looking Beyond Wash-
ington Department of Ecology v. EPA, 14 EcoLoGY L.Q. 69, 88 (1987).
25. CoHn, supra note 24, at 259.
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for the courts in determining jurisdiction. 26 Use of the common law
preemption principles is one method employed by the courts in deter-
mining jurisdiction over Indian lands in the absence of a clear con-
gressional directive. 27 A court must examine and balance federal, state,
and tribal interests to determine whether federal law preempts state
regulation.3
In 1831 the Supreme Court recognized Indian tribes as distinct
political entities. 29 The following year, in Worcester v. Georgia,30 the
Supreme Court held that state laws had no effect in Indian lands.',
The Worcester defendants were non-Indians convicted of living in
Cherokee Indian Country without the permit required by Georgia
statute.3 2 In overturning the convictions, the Supreme Court reasoned
that the state statute violated federal treaties recognizing tribal sover-
eignty. 3 As these treaties were the supreme law of the land, the Georgia
statute regulating non-Indians was held void.1
4
The Worcester decision firmly established the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty. Worcester established that Indian tribes are sovereign
nations the powers of which are not delegated by express acts of
Congress, but rather are "inherent powers of a limited sovereignty
which have never been extinguished." ' 3 As inherently sovereign nations,
the states are excluded from exercising jurisdiction over them.
3 6
However, tribal sovereignty has not been a complete bar to the
exercise of state authority. States may, in certain circumstances, have
legitimate interests in regulating some activities within Indian Coun-
try.37 In such cases, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty "provides a
'backdrop' against which the applicable treaties and statutes must be
read."' 38 This "backdrop" creates a presumption that tribal sovereignty
preempts state regulation. 39
26. Id.
27. Allen, supra note 24, at 88.
28. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-45 (1980); see
also Allen, supra note 24, at 90.
29. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831).
30. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
31. "The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory, within boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have
no foxce." Id. at 561.
32. Id. at 536-37.
33. Id. at 560-61.
34. Id. at 561.
35. COHEN, supra note 24, at 231 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
322-2. (1978)); see also Catherine E. Pope, Note, Environmental Law - Federal Indian
Law -- Recent Developments - State of Washington, Department of Ecology v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, 27 NAT. REsOURCES J. 739, 743 (1987).
36. Pope, supra note 35, at 743.
37. Id.
38. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
39. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 718 (1983).
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The Supreme Court's concept of how tribal sovereignty should be
weighed in the preemption balancing test has been changing.4 Early
decisions showed a trend towards placing less emphasis on tribal
sovereignty. In Montana v. United States,41 the Supreme Court stated
that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what [was] necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations [was]
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and [could not]
survive without express congressional delegation.1 42 This indicates that
the "tribes retain only those powers of self-government that involve
relations among tribal members ... [such as the] power to punish
tribal offenders, determine tribal membership, and regulate domestic
relations among members." 43
In the 1983 case Rice v. Rehner,44 the Supreme Court further
curtailed tribal sovereignty. The Court looked at the historical tradi-
tions of a tribe's sovereignty in the particular regulatory area in
question. 4 Rice involved the application of state liquor laws to Indian
reservations to control both Indian and non-Indian activity. The Court
found no history of tribal control in the licensing and distribution of
alcoholic beverages, and that liquor sales on reservations would have
substantial spillover effects on the state regulatory programs outside
the reservation." Accordingly, the Court afforded little weight to tribal
sovereignty.4 7 The Rice "traditional view test" indicates that tribal
sovereignty will play a decreased role where there is either no historical
tradition or where there are strong state interests that weigh against
it.
Rice appeared to have shifted the presumption in favor of state
regulation in the preemption inquiry. The Supreme Court seemed less
willing to protect tribal sovereignty in disputes over state regulation.
The Supreme Court in Rice afforded more weight to state interests
and placed less emphasis on tribal sovereignty.
However, the Rice "traditional view test" was sharply limited in the
Supreme Court's most recent articulation of the balancing test in
40. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1981). "The
limited, present-day right of tribal self-government has devolved from the broad tribal
sovereignty principle of Worcester v. Georgia, as 'notions of Indian sovereignty have
been adjusted to take account of the State's legitimate interest in regulating the affairs
of non-Indians."' Id. at 1284 n.11, quoted in Allen, supra note 24, at 92 n.144 (citations
omitted).
41. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
42. Id. at 564, quoted in Allen, supra note 24, at 92.
43. Allen, supra note 24, at 92 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
564 (1981)).
44. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
45. Id. at 719-20.
46. Id. at 724.
47. Id. at 725.
No. 11
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California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.41 In Cabazon Band,
two tribes were conducting bingo games on their reservations that were
open to the public and were played predominantly by non-Indians.
While the State of California allowed charitable organizations to con-
duct bingo games, it prohibited prizes in excess of $250. The games
conducted by the two tribes paid much higher jackpots. California
insisted that the tribes bring their games in compliance with California
laws. The tribes sued in federal district court for declaratory and
injunctive relief.
The Court avoided application of the "traditional view test" and
looked to current federal Indian policy. The Court reasoned that "state
jurisdiction is preempted if it interferes or is incompatible with federal
and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests
at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.
'49
The Court found that "[tihe inquiry [was] to proceed in light of
traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of
self-government, including its 'overriding goal' of encouraging tribal
self-sufficiency and economic development."50 Thus, "the Court reit-
erated its [earlier] view that this question should be decided against
the backdrop of tribal sovereignty and Congress' goal of encouraging
economic self-sufficiency.
' 5'
The Cabazon Band decision demonstrates that the Court is now
increasing its reliance on the doctrine of federal preemption. Under
this doctrine, if the application of state regulatory laws will interfere
with the achievement of the policy goals of federal laws relating to
Indians, the state laws cannot be applied. However, "[w]here tribal
and federal interests are adequately protected and the state has a strong
regulatory interest, state laws can be applied to Indian lands.'52 The
Court has yet to apply this balancing test in a case involving a state's
assertion of environmental regulatory jurisdiction over Indian lands.
.I. Jurisdictional Application to Environmental Regulations
Jurisdiction over Indian lands in matters of environmental regulation
has not been extended to the states. Instead, in a demonstration of
support for the EPA's Indian policy, Congress in 1986 and 1987
enacted amendments to the CWA, the SDWA, and CERCLA. These
amendments provide that tribes are entitled to equal status with the
48. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
49. Id. at 216 (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
333-34 (1983)).
50. Id. at 216.




states. 3 Congress has expressly preempted state regulation over Indian
lands for environmental regulation through these amendments.14 As a
result, when programs are implemented under these statutes which
delegate authority to the tribes, the court will not need to balance
interests. 5
Additionally, it appears that even in situations where Congress has
not expressly acknowledged the tribes' regulatory authority, the strong
federal interest will still favor excluding state jurisdiction on Indian
lands for environmental purposes.56 "The federal interest stems largely
from the federal trust responsibility ... [towards the] Indian tribes.
' 57
This "responsibility arose largely from the federal role as guarantor
of Indian rights against state encroachment." 5  Moreover, the com-
prehensive nature of federal environmental statutes demonstrates the
strong federal interest in environmental protection. 9 Congress' recent
actions in granting authority to the tribes under certain environmental
statutes, coupled with the federal policy which supports greater tribal
responsibility over tribal government functions, tribal resources, and
the tribal economy, appear to prohibit control by the states concerning
hazardous wastes in Indian Country.6
Allowing state jurisdiction for environmental concerns in Indian
Country could have a detrimental effect. Often there is tension between
state governments and tribal governments. Allowing state pollution
control laws to govern environmental affairs in the reservation envi-
ronment could result in additional hostility. The remote and sparsely-
populated tribal lands "might become dumping grounds for state
environmental problems." 61 Due to the relatively insignificant political
influence of native nations, the tribal lands could very well be the last
areas of the state to receive attention or implementation of pollution
control programs. 62 Allowing state regulation would in effect give states
the authority to "control pollution resources on and near reservations
53. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 330f-300j-11 (1988)
(SDWA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) (CERCLA); see also DuBey et al., supra note
9, at 466-67.
54. DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 468.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 469-70 (citing Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465,
1470 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d
655, 660 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Seminole Nation v. United
States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
58. Washington, 752 F.2d at 1470 (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375
(1886)).
59. DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 470.
60. Id.
61. Royster & Fausett, supra note 3, at 657.
62. Id.
No. 1]
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to the extent the state deemed acceptable, subject only to federal
minimum requirements." 63 Thus, state jurisdiction would wipe out the
native nations' ability to control pollution consequences within their
own lands. 64
II. Environmental Statutes Providing for Indian Regulation
A. Tribes As States
The federal pollution control laws grant jurisdiction to states to
operate the applicable programs within state borders. 65 Under general
principles of sovereignty, one state may not regulate in the territory
of another. 6 Consequently, by treating tribes as states, other states
would be preempted from asserting jurisdiction in tribal territory. "For
example, if the Crow Tribe is a 'state' for purposes of CWA programs,
the State of Montana can no more assert jurisdiction over the Crow
Reservation than Montana can over its neighboring state of Wyom-
ing.''
67
Four federal pollution control laws - the SMCRA, the CWA, the
SDWA, and CERCLA/SARA - currently contain tribes-as-states pro-
visions. However, these provisions do not completely solve the prob-
lem. The following discussion illustrates that additional amendments
to these laws may be necessary before tribes are indeed treated as
states.
IV. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
In contrast to underground coal mining, which requires removing
coal from the earth, surface mining consists of removing the earth
from the coal. 6 Following the removal of the coal, reclamation of the
mining site takes place in two phases. 69 First comes the back-filling,
drainage, and regrading required to achieve the desired surface con-
figuration.70 Then the surface must be fertilized, cultivated, and seeded
or plmted for revegetation. 7 1 Through the SMCRA, 72 Congress adopted
a program of nationwide minimum environmental standards, with




65. Id. at 624.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 624-25.
68. ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 280 (1988).
69. Id. at 281.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988).
73. FINDLEY & FA nR, supra note 68, at 281-82.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/11
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The SMCRA also provided that tribes shall be considered as states
under the abandoned mine reclamation program. 4 However, an irreg-
ularity appears to exist in the structure of this Act. States may not
receive federal approval of their mine reclamation programs unless
they have approved state regulatory programs.75 If this requirement
applies equally to tribes as states, then tribes are in an impossible
position.7 6 Tribes are not treated expressly as states under the Act's
provisions for regulating surface coal mining. Therefore, tribes cannot
have approved "state" regulatory programs. Thus, despite the express
authorization of section 1235(k), tribes seemingly cannot obtain federal
approval for abandoned mine reclamation programs.
77
The SMCRA additionally provided for a study on the question of
regulation of surface mining on Indian lands.78 The report was sub-
mitted in 1979. The study advanced proposals for remedial legislation,
but the Act has yet to be amended with regard to the regulation of
surface coal mining in Indian lands. 79
Under the SMCRA, treatment as states is available only to tribes
with eligible lands and lands from which coal is produced.80 Eligible
lands are those which were mined for coal or which were affected by
such mining, wastebanks, coal processing, or other coal mining proc-
esses, and abandoned and left in an inadequate reclamation status
prior to August 3, 1977, and for which there is not continuing recla-
mation responsibility under state or other federal laws.81
While the SMCRA purports to treat tribes as states, certain amend-
ments are necessary before tribes will actually be treated the same as
states. Currently, tribes are only considered equal under the abandoned
mine reclamation program. The provisions for surface coal mining
should be amended to also allow the tribes equal treatment with the
states. This would allow the tribes to have approved regulatory pro-
grams and receive federal approval for their mine reclamation pro-
grams. Additionally, the limitation for eligible lands for tribes should
be eliminated. The tribes should be eligible under the SMCRA on the
same basis as the states.
V. Clean Water Act
In 1977 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was amended and
the name was officially changed to the Clean Water Act (CWA). 2 The
74. 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1988).
75. Id. § 1235(c).
76. Royster & Fausett, supra note 3, at 619 n.148.
77. Id.
78. 30 U.S.C. § 1300(a) (1988).
79. Royster & Fausett, supra note 3, at 619 n.148.
80. 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1988).
81. Id. § 1234.
82. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
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CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters with-
out a permit.83 The CWA also requires state certification of permits
covering operations which may result in any discharge into navigable
waters.Y Navigable waters are defined under the CWA as "the waters
of the United States, including the territorial seas.
' 85
The CWA was amended in 1987 to allow treatment of tribes as
states for certain purposes. Section 1377 provides that Indian tribes
meeting certain conditions, such as having a governing body, reser-
vation lands, and the capability to carry out environmental regulatory
functions will be treated in a manner similar to states. 86 Under the
amendments, tribes are treated as states for the following purposes:
(1) grants for pollution control programs under section 1256; (2) grants
for construction of treatment works; (3) water quality standards and
implementation plans; (4) enforcement of certain standards; (5) clean
lake programs; (6) certification of National Pollutant Discharge Efflu-
ent System (NPDES) permits; (7) issuance of NPDES permits; and (8)
issuance of permits for dredged or fill material.8 7
A tribal government which assumes responsibility for programs un-
der the CWA may exercise authority over water resources held by the
tribe, by the United States in trust for the tribe, or by a member, or
water resources otherwise within the borders of an Indian reservation.88
The CWA also contains provisions for federal settlement of disputes
between states and tribes sharing common bodies of water.89
The CWA is a comprehensive statute regulating all waters of the
Uniled States. It contains a savings clause which preserves statutory
or common law claims.9 The overriding federal role in the statute
serves to limit state encroachment on the territory or a neighboring
territory. 9' In the recent Supreme Court decision International Paper
Co. v. Ouellette,92 the Court determined that the CWA does not
preempt a nuisance lawsuit filed in the source (or polluting) state's
forum which does not conflict with the goals of the federal statute. 93
The Court found that even though a state may be harmed by dis-
charges, an affected state only has an advisory role in regulating
83. Id. § 1311(a).
84. Id. § 1341(a)(1).
85. Id. § 1362(7).
86. Id. § 1377.
87. Gover & Walker, supra note 1, at 444.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(2) (1988); see also Royster & Fausett, supra note 3, at 619
n.149.
89. Id.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1988).
91. DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 477.
92. 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (plurality opinion).
93. Id. at 481.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/11
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pollution that originated beyond its borders.9 The Court stated that
the affected state must apply the law of the state where the point
source is located. 95 Ouellette demonstrates the Court's unwillingness to
allow a state to extend its environmental standards to a neighboring
state.96 The decision indicates that if the point source is located on
Indian lands, the state may not assert jurisdiction and enforce its law
on Indian lands. It would have only an advisory role in regulating
such pollution.
VI. Safe Drinking Water Act
The SWDA 97 requires the EPA to set health-based standards for
maximum levels of contamination in drinking water. 98 The SDWA
requires water supply system operators to come as close as possible to
meeting the standards by using the best available technology that is
economically and technologically feasible.9 Primary enforcement re-
sponsibility may be delegated to the states which request it, if the state
adopts drinking water regulations no less stringent than the national
standards and implement adequate monitoring and enforcement pro-
cedures.' 00
The SDWA was amended in 1986 to authorize the EPA to treat
Indian tribes, in circumstances similar to those required under the
CWA, as states. 01 The SDWA also requires the EPA to promulgate
regulations delegating control to tribes on the same basis as states for
the Public Water Systems (PWS)02 and the Underground Injection
Control (UIC)103 programs.1°4 Thus, the tribes have primary enforce-
ment responsibility for PWS and UIC, and the federal government
can provide grant and contract assistance to tribes to carry out func-
tions provided for by the SDWA.105 Under the UIC programs, tribes
are exempted from certain time limitations which are placed upon the
states, and the EPA will prescribe a UIC program where one does not
exist for an Indian tribe.1°6 The 1986 amendments also provide that a
94. Id. at 490.
95. Id. at 487.
96. Id. at 481; see also DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 480.
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-ll (1988).
98. FIwrnY & FAREBR, supra note 68, at 156.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (1988).
102. Id. §§ 300g-1 to 300g-5.
103. Id. §§ 300h to 300h-4.
104. Steven M. Christenson, Regulatory Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Hazardous
Waste in Indian Country, 72 IowA L. REv. 1091, 1108-09 (1987).
105. Gover & Walker, supra note 1, at 443.
106. Royster & Fausett, supra note 3, at 620 n.151.
No. 1]
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tribe may not assume or maintain primary responsibility for public
water systems or underground injection control in a manner that is
less protective of public health or welfare than that of similar state
programs. 07
A. tribe must meet three criteria in order to be treated as a state
under the SDWA: (1) the tribe must have a governing body carrying
out substantial powers and duties; (2) the functions to be exercised by
the tribe must be within its jurisdiction; and (3) the Administrator
must perceive the tribe as being capable of carrying out the functions
in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of the SDWA and
all applicable regulations. 08 The SDWA additionally provides that
where treatment of a tribe as a state is considered "inappropriate,
administratively infeasible, or otherwise inconsistent with the purposes
of the Act, the EPA is authorized to include in the regulations other
means for administering such provisions in a manner that will achieve
the purpose of the provision."'1
In the 1986 case Phillips v. EPA," 0 the Tenth Circuit specifically
addressed the question of whether the EPA was empowered to regulate
on Indian reservations prior to the 1986 amendments to the SDWA.
All parties to the case agreed that the Oklahoma state government had
no power to prescribe a UIC program regulating the Osage Indian
Reserve."' In supporting the EPA's decision, the court found that
Congress intended to include Indian lands in the broad, national scope
of the SDWA." 2 The SDWA and general federal Indian policy clearly
support federal, as well as tribal, authority to regulate Indian lands
to the exclusion of state governments.1
3
VII. CERCLA and SARA
f
In 1980 Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).1 4 The Act was
intended to grant the government authority to clean up active and
abandoned leaking hazardous waste disposal sites."' The goal of CER-
CLA was to place the financial burden of the cleanup on the parties
who were responsible for the problem and who benefitted from the
107. Gover & Walker, supra note 1, at 444.
108. Id. at 443.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(b)(2) (1988); see also Royster & Fausett, supra note 3, at
620 n.151.
110. 803 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1986).
111. Id. at 552.
112. Id. at 555; see also DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 488.
113. DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 488-89.
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988).
115. Martin H. Sokolow, Jr., Hazardous Waste Liability and Compensation: Old




hazardous waste activity." 6 CERCLA distinguished between two kinds
of response: remedial actions, which are generally long-term or per-
manent containment or disposal programs'1 7 , and removal efforts,
which are typically short term arrangements.'
CERCLA, more commonly known as Superfund, made money avail-
able for cleanup efforts. A $1.6 billion fund was provided to pay for
the cleanup of 400 sites targeted by the EPA.119 The fund was financed
primarily through an excise tax imposed on the oil and chemical
industries. 2 However, the limited Superfund monies could not even
begin to cover the dost of all the hazardous waste cleanup. To accom-
modate for the deficiency, CERCLA contained provisions for civil
actions against parties potentially responsible for a release of hazardous
substances.' These provisions authorized civil suits for cost recovery
actions under section 9607(a) and abatement actions under section
9606(a).
CERCLA created liability for four classes of potentially responsible
parties. The federal government, the states, or private persons may
recover hazardous substance cleanup costs from: (1) current owners
and operators of facilities; (2) owners and operators of facilities at the
time of disposal; (3) generators who disposed of hazardous waste at
the facility; and (4) transporters of hazardous waste to the facility.1
These classes of responsible parties are liable for the costs of cleaning
up hazardous waste facilities when there is a release or threatened
release of hazardous substances.lu The parties are strictly liable'24 and
may be jointly and severally liable for all cleanup costs.
Congress gave the original CERCLA statute a lifetime of five years
because of uncertainties over the number of hazardous waste sites in
the United States and the amount of money required to clean them
up.' 25 The taxing authority of CERCLA expired on September 30,
116. Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (D. Del.
1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988).
118. Id. § 9601(23).
119. Virginia L. Martin, Hidden Hazards of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Laws:
Lenders and Title Insurers Beware, 18 CumB. L. Ray. 723 (1988).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(1)(A) (1988). A tax on crude oil, imported petroleum
products, and chemical raw materials raised 87.5% of the $1.6 billion. The taxing
authority began on April 1, 1981, and expired on September 30, 1985. The balance of
the $1.6 billion came from general revenues. Id. § 4611.
121. Id. §§ 9606-9607.
122. Id. § 9607(a).
123. Id. § 9601.
124. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
125. Phillip M. Allred, Georgia's Participation in Superfund, 38 MERCER L. Rv.
525 (1987).
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198:5.'2 An emergency appropriation on April 1, 1986, allowed CER-
CLA to continue. 127 Then, on October 8, 1986, Congress passed the
1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). SARA
increased Superfund to $8.5 billion. It also granted the EPA the power
to assert liens on lands if CERCLA funds were spent for costs of
cleanup, removal of hazardous substances, and other response costs. 20
Recent amendments to CERCLA provide that tribes will receive
treatment substantially similar to the states. 29 Tribes are specifically
authorized to enter into contracts or cooperative agreements with the
federal government to carry out removal or other remedial actions in
cases of releases of hazardous substances, 30 and to assert claims against
Superfund for damages to tribal natural resources and costs of re-
storing or replacing damaged resources.'
3'
However, some definite exceptions to the tribes-as-states provision
exist. Each state is entitled to have one facility on the national list of
priorities for remedial action. 32 The treatment of tribes as states
specifically excludes this entitlement.3 3 Indian nations are also exempt
from certain assurances of future maintenance and cost-sharing re-
quired of states in the case of federal remedial actions.
34
CERCLA amendments also called for a study of hazardous waste
sites on native lands, including recommendations on tribal needs, with
an emphasis on maximum tribal participation in the administration of
CERCLA programs. 15 The survey disclosed that 1200 hazardous waste
generators or other hazardous waste activity sites were located on or
near the twenty-five Indian reservations selected for the survey. 36 The
survey also indicated that hazardous waste management requirements
of Indian tribes may differ from those of states. For example, the
federal law may not adequately protect or even assess the many cultural
or spiritual values unique to Indian tribes. 3 7 Moreover, the economic
12-5. Id. at 531.
127. Id.
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23)-(25) (1988).
129. See id. § 9626; id. § 9603 (regarding notification of hazardous waste releases);
id. § 9604(c)(2) (regarding consultation on remedial actions); id. § 9604(e) (regarding
access to information); id. § 9604(i) (regarding health authorities); id. § 9605 (regarding
remedial actions); id. § 9607 (regarding liability for damage caused during emergency
actions); id. § 9611 (regarding special uses of funds); see also Christenson, supra note
124, at 1108 n.162.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(1)(A) (1988).
131. Id. § 9611(b)(1)(c); see also Royster & Fausett, supra note 3, at 620 n.150.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1988).
133. Id. § 9626(a).
134. Id. § 9604(c)(3).
135. Royster & Fausett, supra note 3, at 620 n.150.




and social impacts resulting from hazardous waste contamination are
likely to be greater on tribes because Indian tribes have less land and
fewer economic development options than states.'38 Accordingly, what
would be a minor matter to the EPA may well be considered a major
on-reservation problem by the tribe. Relocating a tribe could be dis-
astrous to the tribe's well-being and destroy the very fabric of Indian
society as a whole.'3 9
In light of the survey findings, it is critical that tribes be treated as
states. While CERCLA/SARA purports equal treatment, additional
amendments are still necessary before tribal powers will equal state
powers under this Act. Congress should consider allowing the tribes
to list a facility on the national list, and assure future maintenance
and cost-sharing in federal remedial actions.
B. Specific Tribal Participation Provisions
Not all of the federal pollution control laws contain a tribes-as-
states provision. Two federal laws, the CWA and the FIFRA, include
specific language concerning tribal participation in particular programs.
These laws could also be amended to accord the tribes more equal
treatment with the states.
VIII. Clean Air Act
The goal of the CAA is to establish a regulatory program that would
assure the air is free from harmful contaminants, while minimizing
the impact on growth and development, and distributing the burden
of achieving clean air fairly among responsible parties.140 An initial
effort was made in 1955 with the enactment of the Air Pollution
Control Act.' 4' In 1970 Congress restructured the CAA and created
the EPA. 4 2 The EPA was entrusted with the authority to develop and
administer a plan for achieving compliance with the ambient air stan-
dards in those states that failed to adopt their own adequate plan.
4
1
Section 110 of the CAA provides for the development and imple-
mentation of plans that are designed to assure attainment and main-
tenance of the national air standards. 1 " The state implementation plans
must set out the legal authority of the state agency to regulate air
pollution 4 and the fesources that have been made available to carry
out the plan.'"
138. Id.
139. Id. at 460.
140. MARK SQUILLACE, ENviRONmrNTAL LAW: AiR PoIJUnoN 41 (1988).
141. Act of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-145, 69 Stat. 322.
142. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 40 C.F.R. § 51.11 (1991).
146. Id. § 51.20.
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The CAA does not contain a tribes-as-states provision, but delegates
limited jurisdiction over all land within Indian Country to tribal gov-
ernnents by statute. 47 Tribes are authorized to determine the level of
air pollution which will be allowed on their reservations with the same
degree of autonomy given to the states. 48 The CAA also provides for
federal resolution of disputes between Indian governments and states,
when either government objects to redesignation by the other or to a
permit for a new emission source that would cause or contribute to
air pollution in excess of that allowed by the tribal or state govern-
ment.149 Either government may request the EPA to enter into nego-
tiations with the governments involved and to make recommendations
to resolve the dispute. If the parties do not reach an agreement,
however, the EPA shall resolve the dispute and the federal determi-
nation becomes part of the governments' air quality plans.3 0
The enforcement provisions of the CAA apply to "owners," "op-
erators," and "persons,""' but none of these terms specifically include
Indian tribes.1 2 As a result, at least some doubt exists that tribes are
subject to the enforcement provisions of the CAA. The CAA enforce-
ment provisions would more than likely be held to apply to the tribes
since the purpose of the CAA requires national or uniform applica-
tion. 5 An amendment clarifying the enforcement provisions would be
beneficial.
IX. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
The federal statute regulating pesticides is the FIFRA. The FIFRA
contains two significant sections. Section 135 embodies the original
legislative scheme and requires that "economic poisons" be registered
with the EPA before they may be distributed in interstate commerce.
54
An economic poison may lawfully be registered only if it is properly
labeled. 55 Section 136 contains provisions for cancellation and suspen-
sion if an unreasonable environmental risk arises.
56
The FIFRA contains no express provision for the treatment of tribes
as states. However, certain provisions relating to funding, training,
147. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1988).
148. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(g)(2) (1991); see also Christenson, supra note 124, at 1107-
08.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e) (1988); see also Royster, supra note 13, at 621 n.154.
150. Id.
151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(e), 7412(c) (1988).
152. Gover & Walker, supra note 1, at 439.
153. Id.





and certification programs have been extended to Indian tribes.5 The
FIFRA does permit the EPA Administrator to delegate authority to
tribes for operating pesticide applicator certification programs on the
same basis as such authority is delegated to the states. 58 The FIFRA
should be amended to include a provision for equal treatment of tribes
as states.
X. Environmental Statutes Not Providing for Indian Regulation
There is currently only one federal environmental act which does
not contain either a general tribes-as-states provision or an express
authorization for tribes to assume certain responsibilities under the
act. This act is the RCRA. In light of the recent amendments to other
acts, Congress should also amend the RCRA to provide for the
delegation of primary enforcement to the tribes.
XI. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The RCRA 59 provides a comprehensive "cradle-to-grave" program
to manage hazardous wastes. The RCRA made hazardous waste man-
agement a federal concern, subject to a national regulatory program
implemented by the EPA 60 The RCRA directed the EPA to control
the treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal of hazardous waste
that might harm human health or the environment.1
6'
Although the RCRA is comprehensive, Congress did not specifically
address the role of Indian tribal governments under the RCRA.162 The
RCRA vests regulatory authority over hazardous wastes in both the
EPA and the states. The RCRA requires the EPA to develop and
implement regulations for a comprehensive hazardous waste program
that sets forth minimum standards for hazardous waste management. 63
It authorizes any state to develop, administer, and enforce its own
hazardous waste program in lieu of the federal program. 64 Before a
state can carry out its program, the state must submit its program to
the EPA for approval. 6 If the program is equivalent to the minimum
157. 7 U.S.C. § 136u (1988).
158. Id.; see also Christenson, supra note 124, at 1108.
159. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988).
160. DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 455.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(4) (1988).
162. DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 455-56.
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1988) (identification of wastes); id. § 6922 (standards
for generators of hazardous waste); id. § 6923 (standards for transporters); id. §§ 6924-
6925 (standards and permits for owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities); see also Allen, supra note 24, at 77.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 6296(b) (1988).
165. Id.
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federal requirements, the EPA must approve a state's alternative pro-
gram. 66 The RCRA authorizes states to develop regulations that are
more stringent than the EPA's regulations. 167 While the RCRA vests
supervisory control with the EPA, Congress intended states to have
primary authority to implement and enforce their own programs. 68
Although the RCRA and its legislative history are virtually silent
with regard to the protection of Indian lands, the EPA has stepped
forward and addressed this matter by administratively interpreting the
RCFA to apply to Indian lands. 69 It was further determined that the
EPA., not the states, is responsible for implementing the federal RCRA
program in Indian Country. Unless a state can prove otherwise, there
is a presumption against the validity of state environmental laws in
Indian Country.
170
Two federal courts have held that the RCRA applies to Indian lands
and may be enforced against Indian tribes.' 7 ' The RCRA applies to
all persons who conduct hazardous waste activities. 72 The term "per-
son" is defined to include, among others, individuals and municipal-
ities. 7 The term "municipality" includes "an Indian tribe or authorized
Indian tribunal organization."' 74
In Blue Legs v. Bureau of Indian Affairs,7 1 Oglala Sioux Tribe
members brought suit against the EPA, Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA), Indian Health Service (IHS), and the tribe itself for violations
of the RCRA. The United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota dismissed the EPA and its administrator from the
action. 176 It ordered the Tribe, the BIA, and the IHS to submit a plan
within 120 days to bring the dumps into compliance.' This decision
was appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
On appeal, the Tribe argued that it was immune from suit. However,
the Eighth Circuit stated that the text and history of the RCRA clearly
indicated congressional intent to abrogate the Tribe's sovereign im-
munity with respect to violations of the RCRA. 7 8 The Eighth Circuit
166. Id.
167. Id. § 6929.
168. Allen, supra note 24, at 77.
169. DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 456; see also Washington Dep't of Ecology v.
EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1467 (9th Cir. 1985).
170. DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 456.
171. See Blue Legs v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989);
Washington Dep't of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1465.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988).
173. Id. § 6903(15).
174. Id. § 6903(13).
175. 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
176. Id. at 1095.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1097.
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held that the Indian Tribe, the BIA, and the IHS all were liable for
the cleanup of open dumps located on the reservations under the
RCRA.17 9 Blue Legs clearly indicates that the RCRA does apply to
Indian tribes and Indian lands.
The only indication that Congress may have intended to permit state
jurisdictional authority over Indian lands is the RCRA's. treatment of
tribes as municipalities. 80 Various sections of the RCRA provide for
municipalities to receive federal grants and financial assistance, either
directly or through the states, for such activities as materials conser-
vation, resource recovery, and solid and hazardous waste management
facilities.'81 The RCRA also authorizes the Administrator to provide
money to municipalities in states that operate their own hazardous
waste management plans under the EPA approval.8 2 The EPA may
not provide any financial assistance unless the state certifies that the
municipality's use of the funds is consistent with the state's program.
8 3
These statutes provide some confusion because it appears that financial
assistance for the tribes as municipalities is conditioned on confor-
mance with the state's plan.
The EPA recognized that the federal government, in certain cases,
may expressly authorize state jurisdiction over hazardous waste or
environmental matters on particular Indian lands. The EPA's regula-
tions under the RCRA permit a state to seek control over hazardous
waste on reservations. 8 4 The State of Washington was the first state
to seek approval to apply its hazardous waste program to Indian lands.
The Governor of Washington submitted an application on May 3,
1982, for interim authorization pursuant to section 3006(c) of the
RCRA.18 1 An analysis of the state's authority over activities on Indian
lands was included in the application. The application was approved
except as to Indian lands. In respect to the Indian lands, the EPA
concluded that the state had not adequately demonstrated its legal
authority to exercise jurisdiction. 86 The EPA found that "the RCRA
did not give the state jurisdiction over Indian lands, and that states
could possess such jurisdiction only through an express act of Congress
or by treaty. Since Washington had cited no independent authority for
its jurisdictional claim, the EPA retained jurisdiction to operate federal
hazardous waste management programs on Indian lands in the State
of Washington.'
' 87
179. Id. at 1098-1100.
180. Allen, supra note 24, at 78.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 6948(a), (d), (f)-(g) (1988).
182. Id. § 6943(c)(1)(C).
183. Id. § 6949(a)(2)(B).
184. 40 C.F.R. §§ 271.7, 271.1(h) (1991); see also Allen, supra note 24, at 69.
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The EPA's decision was challenged by the state of Washington in
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Washington contended that since
tribal powers were not expressly preserved, the RCRA had eliminated
such tribal powers. 88 Accordingly, Washington argued that only the
federal government and the individual states had authority to imple-
ment the RCRA. It was Washington's contention that there was a
preference for state administration. 8 9 Washington additionally argued
that section 3006 allowed a state to enforce its program "in lieu of"
the entire federal program in the states including that part applying
to Indian Country.19' Thus, it was Washington's position that the
RCRA conferred on the state the right to regulate all hazardous waste
activities within the state, with no exceptions for Indian tribes or
Indian lands.' 9'
The court noted that both the RCRA and its legislative history were
silent on the issue of state authority over reservation land. 92 When a
statute is silent or ambiguous, the courts must, under generally accepted
principles of administrative law, defer to the agency interpretation, so
long as the agency's interpretation is reasonable. Therefore, the court
held that the EPA had reasonably interpreted the RCRA not to grant
state jurisdiction over the activities of Indians in Indian Country. 93
In affirming the reasonableness of the EPA's interpretation, the
court did not rely solely upon traditional principles of deference to
the agency, but held as well that both federal Indian law and federal
Indian policy supported the EPA's position. 94 The Ninth Circuit ex-
amined these federal policies and the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty
as they affected the EPA's interpretation of the hazardous waste
statute. Specifically, the court considered the general principle that
states do not have jurisdiction over natives and native land absent an
express congressional grant; the federal trust responsibility toward
native nations; respect for the long tradition of tribal sovereignty and
self-government; the current federal policy of promoting tribal self-
government; the EPA's commitment to the federal position, in theory
and in practice; and the strong tribal sovereign interest in managing
the environment of the reservation.19S According to the court, all of
these factors supported the EPA's interpretation of the RCRA as




192. Id. at 1469.
193. Id.
194. Ad. at 1469-71; see also Royster & Fausett, supra note 3, at 633.




prohibiting state authority to implement their "in lieu of" hazardous
waste programs on reservation lands.
96
Thus, while the RCRA is silent with regard to the treatment of
Indians, case law has established that the RCRA does apply to Indian
tribes and Indian lands, and that the states are prohibited from ap-
plying their state environmental laws to Indian reservations.
XII. Conclusion
Due to the jurisdictional rules applicable to Indian lands, the EPA
is unable to pursue its usual practice of delegating primary enforcement
responsibility to the states. Although the federal environmental laws,
as originally enacted, failed to address the regulatory authority on
Indian lands, the current view of Congress, the courts, and the EPA
is that states do not have jurisdiction to enforce environmental laws
on reservations.' 9 This indicates that absent specific statutory language
which grants the states jurisdiction over Indian lands, the federal
government through the EPA will retain jurisdiction to implement
federal environmental programs on Indian lands.19
Perhaps the best solution for pollution control on Indian lands is
to allow tribes that are willing and able to assume control over
environmental regulation. The EPA may act as an interim facilitator
and as a source of funding, assistance, and technical expertise in
assisting these tribes.' 99 Such a practice would promote tribal self-
government and build tribal expertise in environmental matters .
20
Development of programs imposing stricter requirements than the
federal or state law would be one option open for the Indian tribes.
Such stricter standards could offer greater protection than the basic
federal standards. 20' While many of the federal environmental statutes
have greatly improved the tribes' position with the recent amendments,
future legislation is necessary to promote comprehensive environmental
management by tribal governments. The SMCRA should be amended
to allow the tribes to have approved regulatory programs and to
eliminate the "eligible lands" requirement. The CWA and the SDWA
should be amended to allow the same treatment for tribes as states,
not just similar treatment. CERCLA should be amended to allow
tribes to list a facility on the national list and to assure future main-
tenance and cost-sharing in federal remedial actions. The CWA en-
196. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985);
see also Royster & Fausett, supra note 3, at 634.
197. Gover & Walker, supra note 1, at 444.
198. DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 503.
199. Royster & Fausett, supra note 3, at 583 n.4.
200. Id.
201. DuBey et al., supra note 9, at 480.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
290 AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 17
forcement provisions should be amended to specifically include Indian
tribes. Also, the CWA and the FIFRA should incorporate a tribes-as-
states provision. Congress should also amend the RCRA to include
the tribes-as-states provision.
Many of these federal environmental acts will soon be up for
reauthorization before Congress. It is critical for tribal sovereignty and
for the protection of the many cultural and spiritual values unique to
Indian tribes that the tribes be accorded the same treatment as the
states, in developing and implementing federal environmental regulatory
programs.
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